

# Cognitive Disconnect: Understanding Facebook Connect Login Permissions

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## ABSTRACT

We study Facebook Connect’s permissions system using crawling, experimentation, and user surveys. We find several areas in which it works differently than many users and developers expect. More permissions can be granted than developers intend. In particular, permissions that allow a site to post to the user’s profile are granted on an all-or-nothing basis. While users generally understand what data sites can read from their profile, they generally do not understand the full extent of what sites can post. In the case of write permissions, we show that user expectations are influenced by the identity of the requesting site although this has no impact on what is actually enforced. We also find that users generally do not understand the way Facebook Connect permissions interact with Facebook’s privacy settings. Our results suggest that users understand detailed, granular messages better than those that are broad and vague.

## Categories and Subject Descriptors

D.4.6 [Security and Protection]: Access Controls

## General Terms

Security; Human Factors

## Keywords

Online social networks; permissions; privacy; Facebook

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Single Sign-On (SSO) systems allow users to log in to websites (called *relying sites* or *relying parties*) using their username and password from a third-party *identity provider*. This creates fewer passwords for users to remember, theoretically meaning that they can have more complicated and therefore more secure passwords [22]. Facebook Connect<sup>1</sup> is

<sup>1</sup>Facebook Connect is now technically called Facebook Login but is still frequently referred to as Facebook Connect.

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perhaps the most popular SSO system on the web today. A key reason is that Facebook Connect, like many SSO systems based off of the OAuth protocol, does more than just allow a user to sign in: sites can request access to read parts of the user’s Facebook profile or write data back their profile. This has been sufficient in practice to overcome the lack of adoption incentives for relying parties which has plagued many other SSO systems on the web [25].

An important selling point is that Facebook Connect requires relying sites to request a specific set of permissions from the user up front in order to read or write data from the user’s profile. These are presented to the user in a series of dialogues (shown in Figure 1) which the user must approve prior to logging into a relying site for the first time. In the words of Facebook, “*The user will have total control of the permissions granted*” [19].

Effective user control relies both on Facebook granting only the permissions intended by developers and on users correctly understanding the permissions they approve. We explore both assumptions and show that:

- Facebook Connect sometimes asks the user to authorize more permissions than the developer intended to request.
- Write permissions are granted to sites on an all-or-nothing basis. For example, if a site wants the ability to update the user’s status, it must also gain the ability to upload photos.
- Users generally understand which read permissions are being requested when they log in, although many do not realize they are granting access to data they have marked as private using their privacy settings.
- Users generally do not understand the variety of write permissions sites will receive upon authorization. This indicates that, despite Facebook’s claim that all-or-nothing write permissions are “simpler” for users to understand, users understand the more granular read permissions better.
- Users are influenced by the identity of the relying site; for example, they are much more likely to understand a photo sharing website can upload photos to their account. This suggests users are assuming a *contextual integrity* model of privacy [20], although this is not implemented technically.



Figure 1: Examples of messages presented to the user. From left: Read permissions message from Yahoo.com, write permissions message from Pinterest.com, and extended permissions message from AddThis.com.

## 2. IMPLEMENTATION OF FACEBOOK CONNECT PERMISSIONS

The first step in determining whether the permissions system provides users with effective control is understanding which permissions are actually granted when a given authorization message is displayed. Facebook Connect’s process of a site requesting permissions from a user can be broken down into three steps:

1. During login flow, relying parties request a set of permissions from the Facebook Connect API. We’ll call this set the *requested permissions*.
2. Facebook receives the requested permissions and translates them into a set of permissions for approval which we’ll call the *granted permissions*.
3. Facebook translates the the granted permissions into a dialogue presented to the user for approval. We’ll call this text the *displayed permissions*.

Ideally, these three sets of permissions would be semantically identical and the text shown to the user would clearly represent them. In this section we’ll explore the difference between the requested and granted permissions; we’ll compare displayed and granted permissions in Section 3.

### 2.1 Methodology

Unfortunately, Facebook’s documentation [3] is incomplete and sometimes outdated. As such, there is very little explanation of how requested permissions are eventually translated into permissions displayed to the user. To gain a better understanding, we combined information from the documentation with observations from integrating Facebook Connect login with a test site and crawled data from several hundred relying sites.

#### 2.1.1 Obtaining a list of relying sites

To obtain a list of relying sites implementing Facebook Connect, we started with the most recent (October 2013) AppInspect [18] database of 25,000 Facebook apps. We filtered this list down to about 400 apps with an external site listed on the Facebook App Center. Finally, we manually identified 91 which had a Facebook Connect login.

Unfortunately, the AppInspect database does not include apps that are used solely for Facebook Connect, only those

[https://www.facebook.com/dialogue/oauth?app\\_id=138615416238413&domain=www.timecrunch.me&response\\_type=token%2Csigned\\_request&scope=email%2Ccreate\\_event%2Coffline\\_access%2Cuser\\_groups%2Cfriends\\_groups%2Cpublish\\_stream...](https://www.facebook.com/dialogue/oauth?app_id=138615416238413&domain=www.timecrunch.me&response_type=token%2Csigned_request&scope=email%2Ccreate_event%2Coffline_access%2Cuser_groups%2Cfriends_groups%2Cpublish_stream...)

Figure 2: Example requested permissions (colored in red) in the scope parameter of the approval page URL.

that have native Facebook apps. To make up for these deficiencies, we took the Alexa Top 500<sup>2</sup> websites from February 27<sup>th</sup>, 2014 and manually identified those with Facebook Connect logins (112 sites). Combining these two lists gave us a total of 203 sites to study.

For crawling we used OpenWPM [15] a Selenium-based<sup>3</sup> web crawler being developed by the Princeton Center for Information Technology Policy (CITP). We performed automated logins to all 203 sites and recorded the requested, granted, and displayed permissions. 26 of the 203 sites used an older version of Facebook Connect; we will focus only on the 177 using the current version.

### 2.2 Requested permissions

Developers request permissions in a parameter called “scope” or “data-scope” when the login process is initiated using Facebook’s JavaScript SDK, Facebook’s login button, or a manually built login system [7]. The developer can request any of the permissions listed in the documentation [6], although some are deprecated and will have no impact on the granted permissions.

The scope parameter is visible in the URL of the page where the user is asked to approve permissions (see Figure 2). We confirmed using our test site that this value is indeed exactly what the developer requested.

### 2.3 Granted permissions

Facebook receives the requested permissions and translates them into a set of granted permissions. The granted permissions may exclude requested permissions that are deprecated, or, in some cases, may add additional permissions. Two permissions, which Facebook calls “Basic Info/Default permissions”[7], are always added regardless of what is requested: *public\_profile* and *user\_friends*. The documentation does not mention any other permissions that may be granted outside of what the developer requested.

<sup>2</sup><http://www.alexa.com/topsites>

<sup>3</sup><https://github.com/cmws1w/selenium-crawler>

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Figure 3: Example granted permissions (colored in red) shown by the *read*, *write*, and *extended* input elements on the permissions approval page for `timecrunch.me`.

Read Permissions
<i>user_activities, user_about_me</i>
<i>friends_activities, friends_about_me</i>
<i>email, contact_email</i>
<i>read_stream, export_stream</i>
Write Permissions
<i>create_note, upload_photos, upload_videos, publish_actions, publish_checkins, publish_stream, share_item, status_update</i>
Extended Permissions
<i>rsvp_event, create_event</i>

Table 1: Groups of permissions which are always granted together if any are requested.

The approval page presented to the user has three hidden input HTML elements named *read*, *write*, and *extended* whose values are the granted permissions (see Figure 3). We confirmed with our test site that these permissions are actually granted and may be used by the relying site, regardless of the requested permissions.

We used these hidden elements to determine which permissions were granted in contrast to which were requested for all 177 sites we crawled. Our results are shown in Figure 4. First, we confirmed that with every site crawled the aforementioned default permissions (*public\_profile* and *user\_friends*) always appear in granted read permissions although they were never requested.

In addition, we identified several requested permissions which always cause extra permissions to be granted along with them (these will be discussed in more detail in the Section 2.3). For example, Facebook’s documentation states that publishing a story (such as liking an article) requires the *publish\_actions* permission. However, if the *create\_note* permission is requested, *publish\_actions* will also appear as a granted permission and this will allow stories to be published. Through experimentation with our test site, we determined exactly which permissions are always grouped together, listed in Table 1. If any one permission in a group is requested, all permissions in the group are granted. Grouped permissions are always displayed to the user with a single message, which we will discuss further in Section 2.4.

All of the grouped read and extended permissions are in pairs, so if the developer requests one they receive the other. However, all eight write permissions are in a single group, effectively making write permissions all-or-nothing.




Figure 4: Permissions requested vs. permissions granted for permissions granted in groups, as listed in Table 1.

## 2.4 How permissions are presented to the user

As mentioned previously, when the user logs in to a site with Facebook Connect for the first time they are presented with up to three messages from Facebook asking them to approve the read, write, and/or extended permissions. We reverse-engineered the algorithm for generating the phrase or word in the displayed permissions message that corresponds to each granted permission using our test site and verified that it matched the data observed in our crawl. Most messages appear reasonably clear. However, the grouped permissions (see Table 1) are displayed with just one corresponding word or phrase indicating that *all* the permissions in that group are being requested. Table 2 presents these potentially unclear messages and their meaning according to the Facebook Connect documentation [6].

## 2.5 Facebook’s response

We sent a security bug report to Facebook stating that we could use the *publish\_actions* permission after requesting any other write permission. Facebook Security stated<sup>4</sup> that “this behavior is by design” and confirmed that when one permission is requested in the scope, they “translate them to a broader set of [permissions] which are easier for users to understand” [1]. When asked why this was done for write permissions but not read permissions, they responded that they “made this change to simplify the experience for developers and for users” and that “write permissions are more similar...whereas read permissions are more distinct.” This motivated us to evaluate whether all-or-nothing write permissions are in fact easier for the user to understand.

<sup>4</sup>Our full correspondence with Facebook is in Appendix A.

<b>Read Permissions:</b> <i>Site_Name will receive the following info...</i>		
Message	Permission	Meaning [6]
email address	email	email
	contact_email	not listed
News Feed	read_stream	access my News Feed and Wall
	export_stream	export my posts and make them public. All posts will be exported, including status updates.
personal description	user_about_me	about me
	user_activities	activities
<i>...and your friends'...</i>		
personal descriptions	friends_about_me	'about me' details
	friends_activities	activities
<b>Write Permissions:</b> <i>Site_Name would like to...</i>		
Message	Permission	Meaning
post to Facebook for you. - <i>or*</i> - post publicly to Facebook for you. - <i>or*</i> - post privately to Facebook for you.	create_note	create and modify events
	photo_upload	add or modify photos
	publish_actions	publish my app activity to Facebook
	publish_checkins	publish checkins on my behalf
	publish_stream	publish content to my Wall
	share_item	share items on my behalf
	status_update	update my status
	video_upload	add or modify videos
<b>Extended Permissions:</b> <i>Site_Name would like to...</i>		
Message	Permission	Meaning
manage your events	create_event	create and modify events
	rsvp_event	RSVP to events

Table 2: Message decoder for permissions that are granted in groups. Italic text represents how the permissions are introduced when presented to the user. See Figure 1 for an example.

\*Which of the three messages is presented depends on to whom the posts will be visible. This is controlled by the menu in the bottom left of the middle image in Figure 1.

### 3. USER UNDERSTANDING

The second critical component in effective user control on Facebook Connect is users' comprehension of the messages describing the permissions they're asked to approve. This is especially important given our findings in Section 2 that all write permissions are grouped together and displayed with a single somewhat-vague message. Previous research by Egelman [14] found that 88% of users have a general understanding of Facebook's read permissions dialogues; however, he studied only the read permissions dialogues. To our knowledge this is the first study evaluating comprehension of write permissions. Together with read permissions these make a fascinating natural experiment: are users better able to understand granular (but complicated) read permissions, or simpler (but vaguer) write permissions? To test this and other aspects of user comprehension, we ultimately conducted three studies:

1. One study tested general comprehension of read and write permissions and compared them to each other (see Section 3.2).<sup>5</sup>
2. One study tested how site identity affects interpretation of the write permissions message (see Section 3.3).

<sup>5</sup>We decided not to test extended permissions since they are presented similarly to read permissions and are relatively rare (only seven out of the 177 sites requested them).

3. Our final study tested to see if users understand that they are giving access to data regardless of their profile privacy settings (see Section 3.4).

#### 3.1 Methodology

We conducted our surveys using Amazon Mechanical Turk, a service where workers can be paid to complete simple online tasks. This allowed a large and reasonably diverse response pool for little cost (we paid 10-15 cents per response). (See Section 3.5 for a discussion of Mechanical Turk's limitations.) All of our surveys took the basic format of presenting users with real dialogues that they might see when logging in to a site using Facebook Connect and asking questions about what actions that site may take if they authorize the login.

##### 3.1.1 Pilot studies

We piloted three different methods of testing user comprehension. After verifying that the respondent had previously seen a Facebook Connect login, all pilots began by presenting the respondent with either a read or write permissions message that they might see when using Facebook Connect. No respondents were presented with both to ensure that no one got the two questions mixed up. Respondents were then presented with one of the following three question types:

1. A yes/no question asking if the site would be able to do something if they clicked okay, such as view their photos or update their status.

2. A list of things the site might be able to do if they clicked okay. The user was asked to select all those they thought the site would be able to do.
3. A free response question asking the user to describe what information they thought the site would be able to do if they clicked okay.

The free response question has the advantage of not prompting the user with any ideas that may not have occurred to them otherwise. However, pilots showed that answers to free response questions were frequently too vague to be useful and that respondents may not have put enough thought into their answers. While this may reflect how users pay little attention to permissions messages in real life when they log in to sites, it is not useful for this survey. There was no noticeable difference in responses between the yes/no questions and the multiple-selection questions, so we chose the latter to get results about more permissions.

We also experimented with showing the respondent messages from different sites. There was some indication that the site influenced the responses. For example, people appeared more likely to think photo-oriented sites like Flickr would be able to do photo-oriented things, such as uploading photos. To keep our independent variables separate, we conducted two different surveys. The first survey (Section 3.2) used the site name “Hooli.com” (Hooli is a fake tech company in HBO’s *Silicon Valley*). The description of the site given to users was a description of a real site, *Splashscore.com*. This was one of the sites piloted and we determined it had an appropriately general-sounding description and could conceivably need a wide variety of permissions. Our second survey (Section 3.3) was designed to test write permission comprehension across different sites.

### 3.2 Read vs. write permissions

Our first study tests general comprehension of read and write permissions in such a way that they can be directly compared. For all questions, we used the site name “Hooli.com” to eliminate the site name as a variable. Our tests were designed to evaluate the the following null hypotheses:

**Null Hypothesis 1.** *Respondents’ ability to identify which read permissions they are authorizing is no different than if they were randomly guessing.*

**Null Hypothesis 2.** *Respondents’ ability to identify which write permissions they are authorizing is no different than if they were randomly guessing.*

**Null Hypothesis 3.** *Respondents’ ability to identify which read permissions they are authorizing is no different than their ability to identify which write permissions they are authorizing.*

This survey was taken by 600 Mechanical Turk workers. All were first asked if they had seen a site use Facebook login before—nearly all had. Half of those who had<sup>6</sup> were presented with Facebook’s standard write permissions message followed by 13 options of things they might be giving the site permission to do by clicking okay. Eight of the 13

<sup>6</sup>Respondents who had not seen a Facebook Connect login were not given the rest of the survey and were excluded from analysis, but were still paid for their participation.




Figure 5: Percentage of people who correctly identified that each read permission would be granted to the site upon authorization.

were taken almost directly from the Facebook Connect documentation’s permission descriptions [6], so they were all things the site would be able to do (since Facebook gives all write permissions together). The other five were things the site could not do. They were present not to be tested but to eliminate biases due to an aversion to selecting all available options. The 13 options were presented in 4 different orders.

The other half were presented with read permissions questions. Since read permissions messages vary, we used messages taken from four different real sites with varying numbers of permissions (*Jabong.com*, *Flickr.com*, *Splashscore.com*, and *TripAdvisor.com*). All were renamed “Hooli.com.” Each message was followed with eight or nine options for things the site might be able to do. Four or five options were information on a Facebook profile that the site would be able to see. The other four were either things the site could not see or were write or extended permissions.<sup>7</sup> Again, the incorrect answers were only so the respondent did not have to select all options to be correct. There are too many different read permissions to effectively test them all without exhausting the respondents with too many questions, so the ones tested are some of the more common ones.

#### 3.2.1 Read permissions results

Figure 5 illustrates the percentage of people who correctly identified that each permission would be given to the requesting site after they clicked okay.<sup>8</sup> Table 3 lists the numerical percentages as well as the 2-tailed *p*-value from a binomial test comparing the number of people who correctly identified a permission as being requested to the expected value with random guessing: half of the total number of people who were presented with that permission.

<sup>7</sup>It is difficult to determine what the site cannot see since the user’s public profile could contain a lot of information if they have relaxed privacy settings, so only very clear-cut things like seeing private messages could be used.

<sup>8</sup>Only the real permissions being requested are presented. The incorrect answers we made up are not.

Permission	N	Percent Correct	2-tailed $p$ -value
see the cities your friends live in	78	80.77	0.000
see your friends' photos	78	76.92	0.000
see what you've liked	78	88.46	0.000
see your status updates	150	77.33	0.000
see which city you live in	230	89.13	0.000
see your wall	72	62.50	0.044
see your gender	72	79.17	0.000
see your News Feed	72	81.94	0.000
see who your family members are	80	67.50	0.002
see your relationship status	80	85.00	0.000
see your exact age	159	71.70	0.000
see where you've previously worked	80	83.75	0.000
see who your friends are	79	84.81	0.000
see what language you speak	79	63.29	0.024
see what country you live in	79	65.82	0.007

Table 3:  $p$ -values for 2-tailed binomial test comparing the number of people who correctly selected each permission to Null Hypothesis 1 of random guessing.

For all tested read permissions, over half of people correctly identified that said permission would be granted based on the message presented. On average, individual permissions were correctly identified 79.72% of the time. This is comparable to Egelman’s [14] conclusion that 88% of users understand generally which permissions are being requested.

Null Hypothesis 1, that respondents’ ability to identify which read permissions they are authorizing is no different than if they were randomly guessing, can be rejected for all but two permissions with  $p < .01$ , suggesting that users have a significantly better understanding of which read permissions they are granting than if they were randomly guessing. We can also reject the possibility that users simply marked every survey option as visible to the website: an average of 81.96% of users correctly identified each of the options that would not be visible to the site. Null Hypothesis 1 for each of these options can be rejected with  $p < .01$ .

Null Hypothesis 1 for “see what language you speak” can be rejected with  $p < .03$  and for “see your wall” with  $p < .05$ . A  $G$ -test<sup>9</sup> shows that respondents were worse at identifying “see your wall” than “see your status updates” (which had an accuracy rate roughly equal to the average) with  $p < .04$  and a  $G$ -test statistic of 4.528. Recall that seeing one’s Wall and seeing one’s News Feed are both granted by the *read\_stream* permission but the message presented to the user says only “News Feed” (see Section 4.1). This may have been the cause of some confusion. Respondents were also worse at

<sup>9</sup>The  $G$ -test is a likelihood-ratio statistical test of independence applicable in the same cases as a  $\chi^2$ -test, but with lower approximation error in nearly all cases than the more traditional Pearson’s  $\chi^2$ -test.




Figure 6: Percentage of people who correctly identified that each permission would be given to the site upon authorization.

Permission	Percent Correct	2-tailed $p$ -value
update your status	34.88	0.000
publish app activity to Facebook	45.85	0.166
add and modify photos	8.64	0.000
add and modify videos	8.97	0.000
publish checkins at locations	12.62	0.000
create and modify notes	5.65	0.000
share items with others	34.88	0.000
publish content to your wall	55.81	0.050

Table 4:  $p$ -values for 2-tailed binomial test comparing the number of people who correctly selected each permission to Null Hypothesis 2 of random guessing.  $N = 301$  for all permissions.

identifying “see what language you speak” with  $p < .04$  and a  $G$ -test statistic of 4.338, but the reason for this is unclear.

### 3.2.2 Write permissions results

Figure 6 illustrates the percentage of people who correctly identified that each permission would be given to the requesting site after they clicked okay. Table 4 lists the numerical percentages as well as the 2-tailed  $p$ -value from a binomial test comparing the number of people who correctly identified a permission as being requested to Null Hypothesis 2, that user’s understanding would be equivalent to random guessing.

For all permissions except for “publish content to your wall,” fewer than half of respondents answered correctly. For all of those except “publish app activity to Facebook,” Null Hypothesis 2, that respondents’ ability to identify which write permissions they are authorizing is no different than if they were randomly guessing, can be rejected with  $p < .01$ . That is, for these six permissions, people would have been significantly more likely to correctly identify whether they were granting the permission by randomly guessing.

The  $p$ -value for “publish app activity to Facebook” is too high to reject Null Hypothesis 2 with a reasonable level of confidence.

Over half of people correctly identified that the site would be able to “publish content to [their] wall,” and Null Hypothesis 2 can be rejected with  $p < .05$ . People may have a better idea that this permission is being granted than if they were randomly guessing.

Worth noting is that the two permissions people did best with (“publish content to your wall” and “publish app activity to Facebook”) are also the vaguest. (These are the *publish\_stream* and *publish\_actions* permissions that are intended to give nearly all publishing permissions.) Because they are so vague, the fact the more people selected them correctly probably does not mean that they fully understand the specific things the site can post on their profile—they include the functions of the other permissions, which most users were not successful at identifying.

### 3.2.3 Comparison of read and write permissions

It appears evident at this point that users understand read permissions messages significantly better than they understand write permissions messages: Respondents correctly identified whether a read permission would be granted 79.72% of the time, whereas write permissions were only correctly identified 25.91% of the time.

To evaluate Null Hypothesis 3, that respondents’ ability to identify which read permissions they are authorizing is no different than their ability to identify which write permissions they are authorizing, we assigned a ranking to each respondent based on the percentage of permissions they correctly identified<sup>10</sup> and separated them into two groups, one for those asked about read permissions and one for those asked about write permissions. A Mann-Whitney  $U$  test of these two groups allows us to reject Null Hypothesis 3 with  $p < 0.001$  and a test statistic of  $U = 9163$ .

## 3.3 Influence of relying site

As previously mentioned, our pilot surveys indicated that the site identity may influence how people interpret the write permissions message. We performed a separate survey with 300 Mechanical Turk workers to test this. The format of the survey was identical to the write permissions questions in the first survey and we provided the same options for the user to select. However, instead of using “Hooli.com” as the website in question, one third of respondents were presented with *Flickr.com* (a photo and video sharing site), one third with *TripAdvisor.com* (a travel site), and one third with *iFlikeU.com* (an anonymous messaging site). (Since there is only one write permissions message, the message presented to the user in all cases was identical aside from the site name and description.)

The results of this survey can be statistically analyzed with a  $G$ -test to see if the number of respondents who thought each permission would be granted varied across the four sites (the three mentioned here plus the data from “Hooli.com” from the first survey). Our null hypothesis is:

**Null Hypothesis 4.** *The relying site’s identity does not affect how respondents interpret a requested permission.*

### 3.3.1 Results

Figure 7 illustrates the percentage of people who correctly identified that each permission would be given to each site after they clicked okay. Table 5 lists the numerical percentages as well as the  $p$ -values from a  $G$ -test comparing the variation in number of correct selections for each permission across all four sites.

For “publish app activity to Facebook,” “add and modify photos,” “add and modify videos,” and “publish checkins at

<sup>10</sup>This counts only the real permissions and not the incorrect options since those were artificially created.




Figure 7: Percentage of people who correctly identified that each permission would be given to the site upon authorization for four sites.

locations,” Null Hypothesis 4, that the relying site’s identity does not affect how respondents interpret a requested permission, can be rejected with  $p < .01$ . More respondents thought Flickr would be able to add and modify photos and videos compared to other sites, which is reasonable since it is a photo and video sharing site. Likewise, many more people thought that TripAdvisor would be able to publish checkins at locations—a logical thing for a travel site to do.

Null Hypothesis 4 can be rejected for “update your status” with  $p < .04$  and “publish content to your wall” with  $p < .05$ . It cannot be rejected for “share items with others” nor “create and modify notes” with a reasonable level of confidence.

## 3.4 Influence of privacy settings

In one pilot survey of the free response format, a respondent stated that the site would gain access to only a limited number of permissions because their Facebook settings prevented them from accessing the rest. This suggests a lack of understanding of how the read permissions work: A site can access nearly everything that is public with only the *public\_profile* permission [9]. By granting the site additional permissions, a user is giving the site permission to access that information regardless of the user’s privacy settings. Using the test site, we confirmed that we could see all user photo albums regardless of their privacy settings with the *user\_photos* permission.

We surveyed 100 additional Mechanical Turk respondents to see if this confusion was widespread. The survey presented the user with the permission message for *Imgur.com*, which requests the *user\_photos* permission. Users were asked to identify which photo albums *Imgur* would be able to see if they clicked okay. The options were those marked as visible to the public, those marked as visible to friends, and those marked as visible to only them (the correct answer is all three).

Our null hypothesis in this experiment is:

**Null Hypothesis 5.** *Respondents are equally likely to indicate that data can be read regardless of its privacy setting.*

Permission	Percent Correct				G-test statistic	p-value
	Flickr (N = 100)	TripAdvisor (N = 93)	iFlikeU (N = 102)	Hooli (N = 301)		
update your status	34	20.43	24.51	34.88	8.662	0.034
publish app activity to Facebook	64	51.61	35.29	45.85	16.733	0.001
add and modify photos	22	7.53	4.90	8.64	15.185	0.002
add and modify videos	15	2.15	3.92	8.97	11.783	0.008
publish checkins at locations	11	24.73	6.86	12.62	10.937	0.006
create and modify notes	6	3.23	11.76	5.65	4.783	0.188
share items with others	31	32.26	30.39	34.88	0.706	0.872
publish content to your wall	65	53.76	44.12	55.81	8.208	0.042

Table 5:  $p$ -values for  $G$ -test comparing the number of people who correctly selected each permission across four sites to Null Hypothesis 4 of no difference between sites.




Figure 8: Percentage of people who correctly identified that Imgur.com would be able to see their photo albums of each privacy level upon authorization.

### 3.4.1 Results

Figure 8 illustrates the percentage of people who correctly identified that Imgur.com would be able to see their photo albums with various privacy settings if they clicked okay. It appears people are generally aware that they are giving access to their photo albums that are marked as public. However, they are generally unaware that they are also giving access to their photo albums that are marked as visible to their friends or to themselves.

Using a  $G$ -test with three degrees of freedom to compare all three test conditions, Null Hypothesis 5, that respondents are equally likely to indicate that data can be read regardless of its privacy setting, can be rejected with  $p < .001$  based on a  $G$ -test statistic of 86.31. Comparing each pair of conditions in turn using a  $G$ -test with two degrees of freedom, we can conclude with  $p < .001$  that participants were significantly more likely to believe photos marked “visible to the public” could be read than either photos marked “visible to friends” or “visible to only me”. However, we cannot conclude with high confidence ( $p \approx .12$ ) that participants were significantly more likely to believe photos marked “visible to friends” could be read than photos marked “visible to only me”. Thus we can reject Null Hypothesis 5 in general and conclude that users do believe privacy settings impact visibility of data to third-party sites, we cannot conclude if the specific privacy settings (visible to friends or only to the user) had a significant impact on user understanding.

Although our first set of surveys and Egelman’s study [14] indicated that read permissions are understood decently well, this study suggests that these results may not actually be entirely representative of user understanding: although people know which types of information they are granting access to, most do not realize they are giving access to that information even if they have marked it with a privacy level other than public.

## 3.5 Limitations

There are several possible limitations to our surveys:

- As discussed previously, by giving respondents several options to select we suggested possible things the site could do that may not have occurred to them otherwise. In addition, in order to respond to our questions they may have paid more attention to the permissions dialogues than they normally would have. As a result, our survey may indicate that users are more aware of what permissions are being requested than they are in practice.
- If read and write permissions are fundamentally different in some non-obvious way, it may be invalid to compare understanding of read permissions to understanding of write permissions. It is possible that users would understand write permissions even more poorly if they were presented granularly rather than all-or-nothing.
- There may be some demographic bias in using Mechanical Turk to collect responses. We did not collect demographic information from respondents although we did restrict respondents to the United States (this was the only restriction we placed on respondents). Our use of Mechanical Turk is justified by previous research finding that “[Mechanical Turk] participants produced reliable results that are consistent with previous decision-making research” [17]. The most relevant concern they raise is of respondents not paying enough attention and becoming fatigued in longer surveys; the short length of our surveys hopefully ameliorated that to some degree. In addition, users are known to pay little attention to permissions messages in practice [14].
- When asking users which permissions were being granted, we had to make up some fake options so users did not have to select every option to be correct. If we did a poor job, this could have influenced results by distracting or unsettling users. We did not count these made up permissions in our statistical analysis for this reason.

## 4. DISCUSSION

Our study indicates that users have a decent understanding of read permissions messages but a significantly worse

understanding of write permissions messages. As discussed in Section 2.5, Facebook claims that all-or-nothing write permissions are easier for the user to understand. However, comparison with the very granular read permissions suggests that users understand specific, distinct permissions better.

We also observe that grouped permissions cause confusion for developers who may receive more permissions than intended due to grouping of permissions. This appears contrary to Facebook’s stated advice to developers that they should “only ask for the permissions that are essential to an app [or site]” [7]. Facebook’s own research has demonstrated that “the more permissions an app requests, the less likely it is that people will use Facebook to log into [that] app”[7]. But because Facebook Connect often grants more permissions than the developer requested (even just by always granting *public\_profile* and *user\_friends*), the developer may have no choice but to receive unnecessary permissions.

We consider several possible explanations for why the system may be architected this way.

## 4.1 Evolution over time

Some of our findings around the permissions API appear likely to be artifacts of the API’s evolution, many of which appear harmless. For example, two permissions for reading an email address exist (*email* and *contact\_email*) and grouping them seems sensible.

It appears that the reason that all write permissions are presented together is that Facebook is gradually eliminating the distinction between different types of publishing under the hood. The description in the documentation for *publish\_actions* is “publish my app activity to Facebook” and the description for *publish\_stream* is “publish content to my Wall” [6]. These are quite vague, and seem as though they could encompass nearly anything. A blog post from a Facebook employee [12] helps explain these permissions: They are essentially the same thing (and are being merged into one) and allow a site to do any type of publishing to Facebook. The post mentions that they can be used to upload a photo, which one may have suspected required the *photo\_upload* permission. Another post from a Facebook employee mentions that developers should only request *publish\_actions* because it encompasses all other write permissions in an effort to “simplify the model” [27]. Furthermore, Facebook’s Graph API lists *publish\_actions* as the permission needed for all API calls that involve publishing [5].

This transition towards only one type of publishing is visible to anyone who has used Facebook for several years: updating one’s status and uploading a photo used to be distinct actions, but now they are both performed by creating a post on one’s Timeline. Perhaps at one point the six granular write permissions (*create\_note*, *upload\_photos*, *upload\_videos*, *publish\_checkins*, *share\_item*, *status\_update*) were the only write permissions. The read and extended permissions that are presented in groups may stem from similar changes in Facebook’s structure and it may no longer be possible to separate them.

It is understandable that changes in the structure of Facebook necessitate changes in the Facebook Connect API to keep it simple and consistent. However, our results suggest user control may be significantly harmed for the sake of simplicity. This threat does not appear purely academic, as there are many malicious Facebook apps that abuse the permissions they are given [13, 21].

## 4.2 Privacy salience

It is also possible that Facebook has evolved towards having a vague write permissions message as a strategy to decrease *privacy salience* [10]. If users thought too many permissions were being granted, they may not use the app or the Facebook Connect platform in general. A vague message allows developers to receive more permissions without losing users.

Evidence that this may be Facebook’s intention can be seen by comparing the current write permissions messages to those from the previous implementation of Facebook Connect. As mentioned previously, 26 of the 203 websites we crawled used an older implementation. Table 6 presents a sampling of the messages we saw. These messages may be misleading since they provide examples of what the site can post based on the specific site even though all sites in the table request only *publish\_actions*. However, these messages do distinctly identify several things the sites can post, unlike the vague messages in the current implementation. Facebook’s choice to eliminate these descriptions may indicate an attempt to be less clear about what permissions are actually being granted.

By itself, limiting privacy salience cannot be a complete explanation because read permissions remain relatively detailed. It may be that read permissions are less concerning to users as write permissions can affect the user’s profile on Facebook itself, so Facebook is less motivated to obscure them. Alternatively, it may be the case that read permissions are in fact more sensitive, since data cannot be un-read whereas unwanted posts from a third-party can be deleted. In this case, it may be that Facebook has decided that its more important to clearly indicate read permissions up front, whereas it isn’t worth concerning users with detailed write permissions since posts can be deleted later.

Site	Write Permissions Message
Starpfires.com	This app may post on your behalf, including status updates, photos and more.
PioneerLegends.com	This app may post on your behalf, including collections you completed, miles you collected and more.
Stratego.com	This app may post on your behalf, including achievements you earned and more.
OpenShuffle.com	This app may post on your behalf, including your high scores and more.
Fupa.com	This app may post on your behalf, including games you played and more.

Table 6: Write permissions messages from sites using an older version of Facebook Connect. All sites are gaming sites. The only write permission requested is *publish\_actions*.

## 4.3 Ineffectiveness of user choice

It is possible that write messages are vague because users are unable to completely understand them (or simply do not

pay attention to them [14]), so Facebook has decided it is better off protecting user privacy by policing developers.

Facebook has publicly attempted to address how general write permissions are by placing responsibility on the developer. The aforementioned Facebook blog post explaining the *publish\_stream* and *publish\_actions* permissions [12] states that since anything can be shared, “it will continue to be the developer’s responsibility to make it clear to the user what content will be shared back to Facebook.” Facebook’s policy was updated to read: “If a user grants [the developer] a publishing permission, actions [the developer takes] on the user’s behalf must be expected by the user and consistent with the user’s actions within [the] app.” This is especially important since our survey showed that users’ interpretation of the write permissions message is influenced by the identity of the site even though there is no difference in the permissions being granted. As of the time of this writing, however, this is no longer mentioned in the Facebook policy [8].

## 5. FUTURE AREAS FOR RESEARCH

This research could be extended in a number of directions.

- The results of our survey testing whether users understand that sites are getting access to their information even if it is marked as private (see Figure 8) indicate that there is room for more research in the area. This should be tested with a variety of different permissions. One could also experiment with ways to make it clear to the user that all of their information is being shared, regardless of the privacy settings.
- We previously mentioned that our survey included options of things the sites could not actually do so the respondent would not have to select all options to be correct. However, many people selected these fake options. One could research what permissions users think are being requested beyond what is actually being requested. This is an important area of research because people may be unwilling to use the SSO service if they think too many permissions are being given.
- It is clear that users do not understand the full range of write permissions being requested. However, Egelman [14] determined that users make their decision to use Facebook Connect or not before they see the permissions requested. Egelman only tested read permissions, though. A similar study could see how the presence of write permissions affects users’ decisions to use Facebook Connect.
- We observed that users understand the granular read permissions better than the single write permission. One could test whether granular write permissions are in fact more clear to users than the current system.

## 6. RELATED WORK

Many researchers have studied the security and permissions systems of various apps<sup>11</sup> and SSO systems. Sun and Beznosov [24] uncovered vulnerabilities in many major OAuth SSO implementations. Chaabane et al. [11] and

Huber et al. [18] identified information leaks in Facebook and RenRen apps. There have also been several studies of what permissions sites request, such as Frank et al.’s study in which Facebook apps were grouped into categories based on the permissions they request [16].

Some studies have tested user comprehension of SSO systems as well. A 2011 audit of Facebook Ireland looked at, among other things, how clearly the Facebook app system is presented to users. It also states that it “is not possible for an application to access personal data over and above that to which an individual gives their consent or enabled by the relevant settings”—that is, Facebook’s permissions do appropriately limit what data an app can access [2].

Sun et al. studied user understanding of the authentication process in general—for example, whether users understood that the site they are logging in to cannot see the password for the identity provider (Facebook, Google, etc.) [26]. The study most directly related to ours is Egelman [14], which studied whether users were willing to use Facebook Connect and how well they understand (and how much they pay attention to) the permissions messages. Egelman concluded that 88% of users have a general understanding that their profile information will be shared with the site they are logging in to, but that they typically do not pay attention to the specifics of the dialogues and do not make their decision whether to use Facebook Connect based on which permissions are being requested.

Our study differs from previous studies by determining what specific permissions correspond to the messages presented to the user and by evaluating user comprehension of these permissions. This lets us answer most precisely whether users understand exactly what information they are sharing by using Facebook Connect. In addition, Egelman only looked at read permissions. We found that write permissions are much more confusing to users.

## 7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

To maximize security and to ensure users feel comfortable using Facebook Connect, developers should minimize the number of permissions they request and the permissions should be presented to the user as clearly as possible. On both fronts, Facebook Connect could be improved.

When a developer designs their site to request certain permissions through Facebook Connect, the Facebook Connect system may translate certain permissions into broader groups of permissions that will all be granted if the user authorizes the site to access their profile. This may force users to give unnecessary permissions to a site in order to log in.

The messages presented to the user for read permissions are reasonably clear—our survey showed that a majority of users understand what data they are providing access to. However, many users are unaware that they are providing access even if this information is marked as private.

Write permissions, however, are much less clear. Facebook has simplified the write permissions process so that every site either gets all write permissions or none. Our survey shows that users do not understand the many things a site will be able to do to their profile if they authorize the vague message stating that the site “would like to post to Facebook for you.” In addition, users’ interpretations of this message vary depending on the identity of the site they are logging in to although this actually has no impact on the permissions granted. Given the relative success with which

<sup>11</sup>The Facebook Connect SSO system uses the same system as native Facebook apps—creating a Facebook login on a website requires creating a Facebook app [4].

users were able to identify the more distinct and well-defined read permissions, it appears users might actually understand write permissions better if they were split up.

On April 30, 2014 Facebook announced an update to their Facebook Login system to be rolled out over the following months that allows users to reject individual permissions or log in anonymously [23]. While this is a big step forward, it appears there is still only one publishing permission and it is presented with the same vague message that our survey respondents had trouble understanding. However, it does provide even more specific details about read permissions.

## 8. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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## APPENDIX

### A. CORRESPONDENCE WITH FACEBOOK SECURITY

As mentioned in Section 2.5, we sent a security bug report to Facebook reporting that we could use the *publish\_actions* permission after requesting any other write permission (see Section 2.3). Below is the full correspondence with Facebook Security [1].

---

#### Initial bug report

##### *Description and Impact:*

I can design a site with Facebook Connect that publishes a story with the ‘publish\_actions’ permission. However, if I request any other write/publishing permission, such as ‘create\_note’, I can still use the ‘publish\_actions’ permission and publish the story. I believe this is a vulnerability because applications may be receiving more capability than they believe they are requesting.

##### *Reproduction Instructions / Proof of Concept:*

1. I followed the Facebook documentation instructions to create a story with the publish\_actions permission: <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/opengraph/getting-started/>
2. If I replace publish\_actions in data-scope with any other write permission, including create\_note, I can still publish the story. (If I replace it with a read permission such as email I cannot.)

---

#### Facebook Security’s response

Thanks for writing in. Can you send in some screenshots of the dialogue you see when requesting the different permissions? I’m curious to see if the wording changes between the two.

---

#### Our response

Below are screenshots of the two messages presented whether I request create\_note or publish\_actions. *[screenshots not shown here, roughly equivalent to Figure 1, center image]*

The HTML for these messages has three hidden input elements named read, write, and extended. The permissions requested appear in their value fields. However, if I request any of the 8 write permissions (publish\_actions, publish\_stream, status\_update, video\_upload, photo\_upload, share\_item, create\_note, or publish\_checkins), all 8 appear in the value of the input element named write. I’ve been researching this for a class project at Princeton University and I’ve confirmed that this is true on 73 of 73 different websites that request write permissions. The only two write permissions messages between the 73 sites are “App\_Name would like to post to Facebook for you” and “App\_Name would like to post publicly to Facebook for you.” The presence of “publicly” is just determined by the selection on the menu on the bottom left of the message page (second screenshot), not by the permissions being requested.

---

#### Facebook Security’s response

I’ll confirm with the Platform team, but I believe this is intentional behavior: as you noted, while in the URL you’re requesting one scope we actually translate them to a broader set of scopes which are easier for users to understand.

---

#### Facebook Security’s followup

I just confirmed with our Platform team that this behavior is by design.

---

#### Our response

Ok, thanks for looking into that. Is there a reason you do that for the write permissions but not for read or extended permissions?

---

#### Facebook Security’s response

The Platform team made this change to simplify the experience for developers and for users. My guess would be that generally, write permissions are more similar (ie: creating a note versus creating a video versus posting all are ways to create content on the site that are not very different) whereas read permissions are more distinct (ie: an app which can view your friends does not necessarily need to view your relationships unless major functionality changes).

*[End of correspondence]*